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A B S T R A C T
Bleuler suggested that fragmentation of thought, emotion and volition were the unifying feature of the disorders
he termed schizophrenia. In this paper we review research seeking to measure some of the aspects of frag-
mentation related to the experience of the self and others described by Bleuler. We focus on work which uses the
concept of metacognition to characterize and quantify alterations or decrements in the processes by which
fragments or pieces of information are integrated into a coherent sense of self and others. We describe the
rationale and support for one method for quantifying metacognition and its potential to study the fragmentation
of a person's sense of themselves, others and the relative place of themselves and others in the larger human
community. We summarize research using that method which suggests that deficits in metacognition commonly
occur in schizophrenia and are related to basic neurobiological indices of brain functioning. We also present
findings indicating that the capacity for metacognition in schizophrenia is positively related to a broad range of
aspects of psychological and social functioning when measured concurrently and prospectively. Finally, we
discuss the evolution and study of one therapy that targets metacognitive capacity, Metacognitive Reflection and
Insight Therapy (MERIT) and its potential to treat fragmentation and promote recovery.
1. Schizophrenia as a disorder of fragmentation
When Bleuler (1950) coined the term schizophrenia he was careful
to suggest that it referred to a group of disorders which shared one
general quality, the fragmentation of previously integrated mental ex-
periences. Influenced by face-to-face interactions with patients, and in
collaboration with Jung (1936), Bleuler used constructs such as
“splitting” to describe the loss of unity or coherence among mental
activities in three primary areas of psychological function: cognition,
emotion and volition (Maatz et al., 2015). Bleuler's model accordingly
suggests a role for subjective psychological phenomena in the pro-
gression of the condition and ultimately its treatment. The subjective
experience of fragmentation, according to Bleuler renders life experi-
ence confusing and as a result, persons retreat from previous social
connections and familiar activities. In other words, after losing a sense
of how thoughts, feelings and desires are meaningfully connected to
each other, persons withdraw into a state Bleuler referred to as autism.
Importantly this stands in sharp contrast to Kraepelin et al.'s (1919)
earlier model of Dementia Praecox in which there is no role for psy-
chological phenomena or treatments. For Kraepelin, social connections
and familiar activities are abandoned after affect and volition wane.
The collapse of psychosocial function is regarded as being simply the
inevitable result of biological processes. Within Kraepelin's model there
is not any particular psychological experience, such as fragmentation
that can help us understand behavior or offer anything more than
supportive or palliative care. Bleuiler's model is also in contrast to
contemporary models descended from the Kraepelinean paradigm,
which also do not see psychological processes as playing a core role in
how the disorder unfolds. For example, dimensional or spectrum
models of psychosis (e.g. APA – DSM 5) and models which reduce
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psychosis into biological, cognitive, and genetic components and clus-
ters (Keshavan et al., 2013) generally also ignore whether there are
psychological processes whose interaction with biological and social
forces, culminates in psychosocial dysfunction. In these models dys-
function is overdetermined by biological and social factors and again
the collapse of psychosocial function is unavoidable.
To date, a range of research, including findings from imaging
paradigms, supports one aspect of Blueler's model, namely that many
diagnosed with schizophrenia appear to struggle to integrate informa-
tion (Picard et al., 2008). One barrier, however, to fully exploring
schizophrenia as a disorder of fragmentation is that it is difficult to
quantify the experience of fragmentation. As proposed by Bleuler
fragmentation specifically involves a loss of the sense of how one's
ideas, personal striving and emotions are related to one another in a
coherent way within the flow of life. Because integration is not a matter
of correctly noticing specific things but the ability to ascertain potential
relationships among those things, the experience of fragmentation is
something fundamentally subjective that cannot be directly detected by
assessing the frequency of correct or incorrect identification of stimuli.
Instead, since fragmentation involves a failure to integrate discrete
experiences persons have of themselves and others within the flow of
life, it similarly cannot be comprehensively measured by assessing the
kinds of beliefs a person endorses.
We suggest that the dilemma of how to measure fragmentation
other than through qualitative and ideographic methods has left the
field less able to test some of the core assumption of Bleuler's model and
hence also stymied the possibility of that model pointing to treatment
possibilities. To respond to this, research has sought to begin quanti-
fying fragmentation in schizophrenia by using the construct of meta-
cognition over the last 15 years. In this paper we will present this work
and its implication for moving from theory to treatment. We will first
describe the construct of metacognition and one specific approach to its
measurement. We then will detail findings of studies of the metacog-
nitive functions of persons diagnosed with schizophrenia as well as
correlates of metacognitive function in schizophrenia with alterations
in psychophysiological, cognitive, emotional and broader aspects of
behavior. Finally, we will discuss the potential meaning of this work for
understanding the tasks of rehabilitation and recovery and offer an
example of one newly emerging treatment inspired by this work.
2. The construct of metacognition
Metacognition has been an explicit subject of research for roughly
four decades, beginning with one of its first formal definitions by Flavell
(1979). Examining the use of metacognition in that early work, Moritz
and Lysaker (2018) have suggested that the term was initially offered as
an umbrella term describing a broad set of processes which enable
persons to notice and reflect upon what happens as they perceive and
respond to events as they transpire. Indeed, research since then has
used the term metacognition to understand how persons plan and
monitor their behavior as well as evaluate possible responses to the
challenges they face (Tarricone, 2011). The word has also been applied
to broad and disparate areas including education (Kuhn and Dean,
2004), memory (Bacon et al., 2001), human development (Main, 1991)
and computer science (Cox, 2005). Concerning psychopathology, al-
terations in metacognitive function have been used to explain the
emergence and presence of a range of transdiagnostic processes relating
to poorer outcomes including maladaptive responses to worry and
sadness (Wells et al., 2009), aberrant cognitions (Moritz et al., 2014),
self-appraisal (Silberstein et al., 2018) complex social situations (Ottavi
et al., 2014) and interpersonal conflict (Dimaggio et al., 2015).
To sort out the increasing volume of metacognitive research and
various approaches to its definition and measurement, particularly re-
garding mental health, an integrated model of metacognition has been
proposed (Lysaker et al., 2018a; Lysaker and Dimaggio, 2014). This
model is founded on the assumption that self-conscious awareness and
reflection are responses to the various ways in which the world and the
self is disclosed or becomes apparent to us through our ongoing em-
bodied, affective, and cognitive experience, much of which takes place
pre-reflectively. Through the lens of the integrated model, metacogni-
tion is seen as allowing for a sophisticated synthesis of these responses
and is conceptualized as a spectrum of activities that mutually influence
one another. These activities range from the awareness of discrete and
immediate experiences such as a bodily sensations to the apprehension
of a larger more complex sense of self and others composed of multi-
faceted aspects which can be independent, complementary and con-
tradictory (Lysaker et al., 2018c). Accordingly, what are referred to as
bottom-up and top-down processes occur simultaneously as discrete
information offers the building blocks whose integration results in
larger ideas, which in turn affect the way new discrete information is
processed.
The integrative model of metacognition, as studied across disorders
and research paradigms, views the construct as a set of processes in
which pre-reflective and reflective, embodied, and cognitive experi-
ences are, in the moment, interpreted, and those interpretations are
then in turn adjusted (or not) in response to what those experiences
disclose. While the term “metacognition” is identified as a cognitive
process, it is important to note that the metacognitive model empha-
sizes the presence of another's subjectivity as essential for metacogni-
tive processes to take place. Thus, our sense of ourselves and others is
developed via intersubjectivity, either formed explicitly with and in the
company of others or in the context of implied or imagined others who
might hear or respond to those thoughts or ideas (Mascolo, 2016; Stern,
1985).
The sense of self enabled by metacognition orients us in a changing
world. Metacognition is a key element of human adaptation by allowing
for the self to be a subject of reflection and change in its own right. We
act on the basis of metacognitive insights and reflect on our lives in the
wake of those actions. Metacognition thus keeps us elastic and re-
sponsive to a world of complex and evolving contingencies (Lysaker
and Klion, 2017). Crucially, metacognitive capacity is dynamic but
growth in metacognition need not lead to the development of a clear
singular and transparent view of the self. Instead, it may allow persons
to more effectively recognize and acknowledge aspects of themselves
which seem incomprehensible or opaque. Moreover, growth in meta-
cognitive capacities should enable persons to identify and distinguish
different aspects of self and other in a more nuanced manner, which in
turn should generate a more differentiated sense of the world. Meta-
cognitive processes thus also allow for increased intimacy. They make it
possible for us to see the uniqueness of people beyond the influence of
strong feelings of desire and dependence and allow for nuanced and
individuated responses to those others.
Importantly, a person's capacity for metacognition is not assessed
categorically or dichotomized as present or absent. Instead, metacog-
nition varies along measurable dimensions. Indeed, we would expect
natural variation in these capacities in the population, with some
evincing better ability to view themselves and the world in an in-
tegrative manner. In terms of those who experience disordered in-
tegration of reflective knowledge, we would not expect the complete
absence of metacognitive capacity and thus, no sense of self whatso-
ever. Instead, with reduced capacity for metacognition persons may
have a sense of themselves and others but that sense is increasingly
fragmented and less available to be used to adaptively respond to a
complex world. In addition to the level of metacognition being dy-
namic, its associations with outcome might also change. An association
of a particular facet of metacognition with a particular outcome may
depend on the relative presence of absence of other aspects of meta-
cognition. For example, reflective knowledge may sometimes lead to
relief but at other times also induce pain, particularly when the psy-
chological pain is not yet accompanied by the ability to use the re-
flective knowledge for one's own benefit.
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3. The relationship of metacognition to other forms of cognition
As a construct describing processes which enable persons to have an
integrated sense of self and others as a basis of understanding and ac-
tion, “metacognition” overlaps with other terms which characterize
thoughts people have about themselves and others. Metacognition
overlaps with neurocognitive functions such as memory, attention and
executive function. For example, with a grossly impaired memory it
would not be possible to form an integrated sense of oneself. However,
metacognition can be distinguished from neurocognition in that it re-
fers to an iterative, reflective activity which pertains directly to how
people experience and understand themselves positioned in and re-
sponding to the world at a particular moment and in a particular set of
contexts. This process involves more than particular recollections and
judgments about specific concrete tasks and events. Metacognition thus
allows us to answer complex questions like: ‘In general, am I a friendly
person?’ Such answers require one to integrate a broad range of in-
formation about oneself and the world and is subjective in nature,
unlike questions like: ‘What do you see now?’ or ‘What did you have for
lunch yesterday?’ Again, metacognition builds upon the foundational
neurocognitive acts required to answer the latter questions, but it
transcends them in the scope of its concerns and the complexity of its
operations.
Metacognition also overlaps with the constructs of social cognition
(Deckler et al., 2018) and mentalization (Allen et al., 2008) in that it is
concerned with the ideas people form about themselves and others.
Metacognition is distinct from social cognition, in that, when oper-
ationalized, social cognition is more concerned with the accuracy of
how social events are interpreted. For example, intact social cognition
might typically be conceptualized as the ability to make an inference
about another's emotional state at the moment (e.g. sad) which others
agree is correct. In contrast, having greater metacognitive capacities
would allow someone to integrate information about the other in a way
that is responsive to context as part of a dynamic process rather than
making a static assessment.
Metacognition differs from mentalization in both its theoretical
basis and its components. Mentalization refers to the formation of ideas
about oneself and others. However, mentalization binds reflective
abilities to attachment styles. In contrast, the integrative model of
metacognition allows that fundamental reflective abilities are not re-
ducible to attachment patterns or basic abilities to respond to affect and
distress (Fonagy et al., 2002). From a metacognitive perspective, for
example, one could use one's metacognitive capacities to decide how to
live with a less healthy attachment style or address a tendency to
overrespond to distress. An additional difference between the two
constructs is that the integrative model of metacognition distinguishes
forming a sense of self and others from the ability to enact this in life as
an agent rather than presuming the presence of knowledge as sufficient
for its implementation.
4. Measuring metacognition
Echoing concerns about the measurement of the core disturbances
that Bleuler links to schizophrenia, measuring the relative integration
of information in senses of self and others faces multiple challenges.
Unlike a person's ability to attend to, remember, or categorize in-
formation, metacognition cannot be measured in terms of correct and
incorrect responses. As noted above metacognition involves the in-
tegration of information and thus when functioning effectively, meta-
cognitive processes produce an integrated and complex sense of self and
others. Importantly, this integrated understanding does not necessarily
reflect ideas which are objectively accurate in terms of content. For
example, two persons with intact metacognitive capacities could form
complex ideas of a third person which differ from one another in terms
of content, but which are equally rich, coherent and link many different
pieces of information. It is important here to note that with intact
metacognitive capacities these complex ideas would be en-
vironmentally informed and adaptive in context and not merely an
unrelated stream of guesses about others.
The assessment of metacognitive capacity thus requires an evalua-
tion of the degree of its integration, which ranges from disintegration to
synthesis, rather than its correctness. One attempt to measure the de-
gree of integration in sense of self and others, with a particular focus on
schizophrenia is the Metacognition Assessment Scale-Abbreviated
(MAS-A; Lysaker et al., 2005a). Concretely, this is a rating scale which
is used to assess metacognition as it is apparent within personal nar-
ratives. The MAS-A was developed in 2004 using several basic char-
acteristics of the original Metacognition Assessment Scale (MAS;
Semerari et al., 2003), a scale itself originally designed to assess
changes in the frequency of different metacognitive acts across psy-
chotherapy sessions. Like the MAS, the MAS-A distinguishes between
metacognitive acts on the basis of their principal concern, namely, the
self, others, the interconnection between persons within the larger
community (decentration), and the use of metacognitive knowledge to
identify and respond to psychosocial challenges and distress (mastery).
The MAS-A deviates from the MAS in its conceptualization of meta-
cognitive activities as divisible into a series of levels which range from
elemental to more complex, with each gradation indicating an increase
in complexity. Further, it assumes that satisfactory function at any
given level requires satisfactory function at lower levels such that once
a given level is significantly impaired, activities at all higher levels
cannot be satisfactorily performed.
5. Metacognition in schizophrenia
5.1. Characteristics in schizophrenia
Comparing the metacognitive capacity of 166 adults diagnosed with
schizophrenia to 51 adults who experienced a non-psychiatric pro-
longed and life-altering medical condition, Lysaker et al. (2014) found
the schizophrenia group had far more limited abilities as assessed with
the MAS-A than the control group. Specifically, they struggled to form a
cohesive sense of {i} one's own shifting emotions and beliefs, {ii}
others' emotions {iii} other's perspective and needs and {iv} how to
respond to psychosocial challenges other than by completely avoiding
them. In this study, the control group had been diagnosed with HIV in
part ensuring that both groups faced social and medical adversity and
thus any observed difficulties in the schizophrenia were likely not just
the result of those adversities. While this study focused on patients who
had lived with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, often for decades, similar
decrements in metacognitive function have been reported in samples
with first episode psychosis (Trauelsen et al., 2016; Vohs et al., 2014).
Other research conducted internationally shows evidence of metacog-
nitive deficits among persons diagnosed with schizophrenia, including
samples from Australia (Bargenquast and Schweitzer, 2014), Chile
(Lysaker et al., 2018b), China (WeiMing et al., 2015), Denmark
(Trauelsen et al., 2016), French Canada (Massé and Lecomte, 2015),
Germany (Bröcker et al., 2017; Buck et al., 2014; Kukla et al., 2013;
Lysaker et al., 2011d; Snethen et al., 2014), Israel (Hasson-Ohayon
et al., 2015), Italy (Nicolo et al., 2012; Popolo et al., 2017), the Neth-
erlands (de Jong et al., 2019a). Spain (Inchausti et al., 2017a) Turkey
(Tas et al., 2014) and the United Kingdom (McLeod et al., 2014). This
work is consistent with older literature suggesting that deficits in source
monoitoring, or the ability to notice and follow the generation of one's
own thoughts, are common among persons with schizophrenia (Keefe
et al., 1999).
5.2. Comparisons with other samples
Concerning the relative levels of metacognitive functioning in
schizophrenia, multiple studies using the MAS-A suggest that greater
levels of fragmentation are experienced by persons diagnosed with
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schizophrenia in comparison to people with other psychiatric diag-
noses. To date at least three studies have suggested metacognitive
deficits are greater in patients with schizophrenia compared to those
with bipolar disorder (Lysaker et al., 2018b; Popolo et al., 2017; Tas
et al., 2014). Other studies have reported greater metacognitive deficits
in schizophrenia relative to others with diagnoses of depression and
anxiety disorders (WeiMing et al., 2015), PTSD (Lysaker et al., 2015a),
substance use (Inchausti et al., 2017b), and borderline personality
disorder (Lysaker et al., 2017) as well as others without any psychiatric
condition (de Jong et al., in press; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015). Studies
of metacognition in first episode depression and chronic depression
suggest greater metacognitive dysfunction than community controls but
better metacognition than what is commonly found in schizophrenia
(Ladegaard et al., 2014; Ladegaard et al., 2016).
5.3. Associations with neurobiological indices
Using refined technologies that have increased our ability to explore
biological correlates of higher order cognitive processes in psychotic
illness, studies have explored the association of metacognition, as as-
sessed with the MAS-A, with neurobiological function at many different
levels of analysis. Neuroimaging technology, such as electro-
encephalogram (EEG; Leonhardt et al., 2017; Vohs et al., 2016) and
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI; Buchy et al., 2015; Francis et al.,
2017; Vohs et al., 2015a) have been employed to elucidate neural
correlates of metacognitive processes. In terms of EEG, increased
gamma activity, which is commonly thought to represent cognitive
processing, was linked with a decreased ability to see the world from
multiple perspectives, implicating disrupted neural information pro-
cessing as a substrate of metacognition (Vohs et al., 2015a). Another
EEG study demonstrated that the inability of neural networks in psy-
chosis to respond normally to auditory stimulation was also associated
with metacognitive processing (Leonhardt et al., 2017).
Additionally, studies utilizing MRI have examined both structural
and functional neural correlates of metacognition. One preliminary
investigation found positive correlations between increased medial
prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum gray matter density and higher
metacognition in an early phase psychosis sample (Vohs et al., 2016).
Another study with persons at clinical high risk for psychosis demon-
strated an association between metacognition and cortical thickness in
inferior and middle frontal gyri, the superior temporal cortex and the
insula (Buchy et al., 2015). In terms of functional MRI, a recent study in
persons with early phase psychosis reported that higher metacognitive
capacity was associated with stronger functional connectivity between
the medial prefrontal cortex, precuneus and posterior cingulate cortical
structures (Francis et al., 2017). Overall this work is consistent with
other imaging work linking frontal function with both self-reflectivity
and psychosocial behavior including a recent study which found that
increased activation of rostrolateral prefrontal cortex during a self-re-
flection task was associated with higher levels of social activity in
schizophrenia (Pinkham et al., 2018). Finally, exploring the link of
peptide hormones which affect social function, a recent investigation
found that altered oxytocin levels are indeed linked with metacognitive
deficits (Aydin et al., 2018).
5.4. Associations with cognitive disorganization
Formal thought disorder, manifested by disorganized speech has
demonstrated moderate associations with reduced metacognitive ca-
pacity in schizophrenia, as assessed with the MAS-A (Hamm et al.,
2012; Lysaker et al., 2005b; Minor and Lysaker, 2014). Cognitive dis-
organization, a concept related to thought disorder has also been shown
to moderate the links between neurocognition and metacognition
(Minor and Lysaker, 2014; Minor et al., 2015), with results suggesting
that the relationship of neurocognitive and metacognitive capacity is
weakened when cognitive disorganization is present. Disorganized
speech at the level of the deep semantic structures which allow for
coherence within a speech sample, has also been linked with meta-
cognitive capacity (Minor et al., 2018). Using factor analysis to disen-
tangle the constructs of metacognition and social cognition Lysaker and
colleagues (2013) demonstrated that each construct had a unique re-
lationship with cognitive disorganization. The distinctiveness of both
metacognition and cognitive disorganization has also been demon-
strated by a recent network analysis that identified cognitive dis-
organization and self-reflectivity as the most central nodes in a network
of social cognition, neurocognition, symptom and metacognitive in-
dices (Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2018). This is consistent with earlier re-
search finding that disorganization in schizophrenia may be related to
deficits in source monitoring (Harvey and Serper, 1990).
5.5. Associations with psychological functions
In terms of psychological functions metacognition has also been
related to important behaviors requiring an awareness of self and others
in schizophrenia. Lesser capacities for metacognition have been linked
with a lesser awareness of illness, or poor insight, in both early and later
phases of illness (Lysaker et al., 2011b; Nicolo et al., 2012; Vohs et al.,
2015b). This finding contributed to the development of an integrated
model of insight (Vohs et al., 2015b) which suggests that metacognitive
deficits are a proximal cause of poor insight when they interfere with
the capacity to form complex ideas about changes in thoughts, emotions
and behaviors resulting from mental illness as well as the historical
events surrounding those changes. Supporting this model is a recent
latent class analysis of 324 adults with schizophrenia that revealed
three classes of patients with poor insight and differing symptom pro-
files, who had poorer metacognitive capacity as assessed with the MAS-
A, than a fourth group with good insight (Lysaker et al., 2018d). In
terms of reasoning about larger issues, better metacognition has also
been linked with greater abilities to make accurate judgements based
on probabilistic reasoning (Buck et al., 2012). In terms of more general
forms of psychological functioning, poorer metacognition has been
linked to lower levels of subjective recovery (Kukla et al., 2014), and
predicts concurrent and future levels of intrinsic motivation (Luther
et al., 2016a; Luther et al., 2016b). Research has suggested that greater
levels of metacognitive capacity may positively influence social cogni-
tive abilities to recognize and relate to others' emotional states (Bonfils
et al., 2019; James et al., 2018a). Greater levels of metacognitive ca-
pacity also may moderate the relationship between emotional aware-
ness and self-esteem among participants with schizophrenia (Bonfils
et al., 2016).
5.6. Associations with psychosocial function and negative symptoms
Concerning behavior and functioning, metacognition, as assessed
with the MAS-A, has also been found, concurrently and prospectively to
predict work functioning (Lysaker et al., 2010), physical activity
(Snethen et al., 2014), response to rehabilitation work experience (de
Jong et al., 2014) and social behavior (Lysaker et al., 2011c) in-
dependent of general levels of psychopathology or neuropsychological
functioning. Cross-sectional research across diverse international set-
tings using the MAS-A has also found that lower levels of metacognitive
capacity were associated with more severe levels of negative symptoms
(Lysaker et al., 2005a; Lysaker et al., 2018b; MacBeth et al., 2016;
Nicolo et al., 2012; Popolo et al., 2017; Trauelsen et al., 2016; Vohs
et al., 2014; WeiMing et al., 2015). A cluster-analytic study of 163
adults with prolonged schizophrenia found that a group identified as
experiencing anhedonia without depressed mood had poorer meta-
cognitive capacities than another group without anhedonia or a group
with both anhedonia and depressed mood (Buck et al., 2014). A recent
latent class analysis of 334 adults with schizophrenia similarly found
impairments in social function were generally tied to lower levels of
metacognitive capacities regardless of the accompanying symptom
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profile (Gagen et al., In press). More compelling studies have found that
greater metacognitive deficits predict more severe negative symptoms 6
to 36months in the future after controlling for initial levels of negative
symptoms (Austin et al., In press; Hamm et al., 2012; Lysaker et al.,
2015c; McLeod et al., 2014). Of note, a recent meta-analysis (Arnon-
Ribenfeld et al., 2017) has concluded that there are significant asso-
ciations between metacognitive deficits and both symptomatic and
functional outcome measurements among persons with schizophrenia.
This is consistent with research finding that reduced awareness of
cognitive deficits, a construct that overlaps with metacognition, pre-
dicts poorer function (Gould et al., 2013) including at least one study
which found the inability to appraise one's own performance on an
executive functioning task was a strong predictor of poor psychosocial
functioning (Gould et al., 2015).
6. The development of an individualized treatment for
metacognitive deficits in schizophrenia: Metacognitive Reflection
and Insight Therapy (MERIT)
6.1. Treating metacognition to address fragmentation
In tandem with the research described above, interest in the po-
tential for treatments to improve metacognitive capacity in schizo-
phrenia has naturally grown. Specifically, if the loss of metacognitive
capacity is one element of the fragmentation which lies near the
foundation of schizophrenia, then a psychosocial treatment that ad-
dresses these deficits might well represent a substantial advance in our
understanding of how to treat proximal and malleable causes of im-
pairment.
6.2. Defining metacognitively oriented psychotherapy
The first formal efforts to develop a metacognitively oriented psy-
chotherapy targeting fragmentation in schizophrenia sought to docu-
ment improvements in metacognitive capacity and tie those with de-
velopments in the ability to form a coherent sense of psychological
challenges as well as the emergence of a richer sense of self and per-
sonal agency (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2005; Lysaker and Lysaker, 2001),
as well as one's reaction to those challenges and so become a platform
for the emergence of sense of agency (Lysaker et al., 2005b). Using the
MAS-A and other instruments to assess metacognition, self-experience
and related content within sessions spanning two and a half years, early
evidence was found suggesting that metacognition improved in a non-
linear fashion over time in psychotherapy, with gains often followed by
losses ultimately leading to the patient becoming better able to think
about his “abilities and disabilities, and his connections with others”
(Lysaker et al., 2005b; p. 412). This finding was subsequently replicated
in a second case study suggesting that growth in metacognition as as-
sessed with the MAS-A could be differentially observed in sense of self,
awareness of others, and mastery or the ability to respond challenges on
the basis of a nuanced sense of self and others (Lysaker et al., 2007a). In
this study, growth in metacognitive capacity was also shown to predict
reductions in delusions. Of note, in both case studies, patients at the
outset of treatment had significant levels of symptomatology and psy-
chosocial dysfunction despite active pharmacological interventions.
On the basis of these and other case studies it was suggested that
treatment addressing metacognition should possess at least two general
qualities. First, such interventions need to be integrative (Lysaker et al.,
2007b). If the integration of experience is a principal goal, one cannot
afford to limit the experiences that might be examined in psy-
chotherapy by the use of single theory or approach. For example, while
the basics of one theory may well capture the struggles of one patient to
think about him or herself, that theory may be dramatically less ap-
plicable to a different patient. Second, a formal assessment method is
needed to quantitatively measure metacognitive capacity so that in-
terventions can be offered appropriate for that capacity. In regard to
this second condition, it was suggested that the MAS-A scales might not
only offer a way to assess outcome but also a way to guide targeted
interventions on the basis of assessment of metacognitive capacity
(Lysaker et al., 2011a). In other words, the MAS-A could provide a
means for assessing in the moment what kinds of interventions a patient
might be able to understand and what kinds of intervention might go
beyond their metacognitive capacity and consequently surpass their
ability to make use of or understand that intervention.
6.3. Operationalizing metacognitively oriented psychotherapy
Following these observations and continuing empirical research on
metacognition, a multidisciplinary group including psychologists, psy-
chiatrists, psychoanalysts and nurse practitioners developed a set of
measurable processes or elements that should be present in each psy-
chotherapy session in order to promote metacognitive capacity (Lysaker
and Klion, 2017). These processes were intended to be consistent with
the common factors of psychotherapy and usable by therapists from
different theoretical orientations (e.g., cognitive behavioral, psycho-
dynamic, rehabilitative and humanistic), who could creatively weave
them into their practice to respond to patients with heterogeneous
needs.
This multidisciplinary group settled on eight elements divided into
three classes: content, process and superordinate (Lysaker and Klion,
2017). There are four content elements which require: explicit attention
to {i} the development of a joint understanding of patients' agendas,
{ii} the development of a therapeutic dialogue, {iii} exploration of
patients' narratives, and {iv} recognizing psychological challenges.
There are two process elements which require: {v} reflection on the
interpersonal and psychological processes within the session that sup-
port joint reflection on patients' lives and experiences, and {vi} atten-
tion to the effects of all of these processes on what is happening in
patients' minds and bodies. Finally, there are two superordinate ele-
ments, which require that therapist interventions {vii} match patients'
capacity for thinking about themselves and others and {viii} promote
patients' capacity for mastery or the ability to use metacognitive
knowledge to actively and effectively respond to psychosocial chal-
lenges (Lysaker and Klion, 2017).
6.4. Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT)
This form of therapy, later dubbed Metacognitive Reflection and
Insight Therapy (MERIT) by Dutch researchers (Lysaker and Klion,
2017), shares several things in common with widely utilized ap-
proaches including cognitive behavioral therapies, such as an emphasis
on the alliance and the patient's experience of their own thoughts and
feelings. However, it sought to move beyond these shared components
in its holistic consideration of how embodied and pre-reflective ex-
perience is integrated alongside more effortful forms of cognition to
enable a personal understanding of one's own life circumstance and
challenges (Lysaker and Hasson-Ohayon, 2018). MERIT also rejects the
notion that one fixed curriculum, recurrent singular techniques or set of
formal exercises can facilitate the development of a richer account of
experience. Instead, like many humanistic and contemporary psycho-
dynamic treatments, it relies on joint reflection in an intersubjective
context. In contrast to humanistic and psychodynamic treatments,
however, MERIT holds that joint reflection requires that the kinds of
meaning that persons can make of experience is affected or limited by
their abilities to integrate information (Lysaker et al., 2018c). Along
with treatment models aligned with certain phenomenological accounts
of psychosis (Fuchs and Röhricht, 2017), MERIT is similarly interested
in self-experience. However, unlike those models, it holds that the
fragmentation of experience in psychosis ranges from disruptions in
embodied experience to higher-order, effortful reflection. MERIT also
assumes that the fragmentation of experience can in part be resolved
through compassionate joint reflective processes which transpire within
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the therapeutic relationship (Lysaker et al., In Press).
Finally, MERIT assumes that the growth of metacognitive capacity
only occurs through a person's participation in the world and not from
disembodied reflection at a distance of one's life. Specifically, an
iterative process is naturally assumed to take place as patients experi-
ence a sense of self that is becoming more available, interacts with a
growing sense of how to respond to life challenges. This is consistent
with findings suggesting that greater participation in basic psychosocial
activities is related to a greater capacity for accurate self-appraisal as
judged by others (Gould et al., 2013).
6.5. Evidence supporting MERIT
Two randomized, controlled trials, lasting eight and six months
respectively, have demonstrated an acceptance rate for MERIT of over
two thirds of patients with prolonged and first episode schizophrenia,
with participation in MERIT also leading to meaningful metacognitive
or clinical gains (de Jong et al., 2019a; Vohs et al., 2018). Similar rates
of improvement and participation in treatment were also reported in an
open trial of a 12week version of MERIT (de Jong et al., 2016a) and
1–2 years of metacognitively focused, individual psychotherapies of-
fered to 11 persons with schizophrenia that conformed to the elements
of MERIT and lasted between 11 and 26months (Bargenquast and
Schweitzer, 2014). Of note, a three year follow-up of participants in the
latter, open trial revealed persistent gains in metacognition and func-
tion (Schweitzer et al., 2017).
From a different vantage point, qualitative studies have offered
preliminary evidence of the usefulness of MERIT. In two studies com-
paring patients who had received MERIT vs. more supportive therapy
experiences, patients who received MERIT were more likely to describe
how the treatment {i} helped them develop a deeper sense of personal
agency and {ii} enabled them to use their unique, personal history to
make sense of their challenges and emotional pain (Lysaker et al.,
2015b; de Jong et al., 2019b). Finally, detailed case studies of patients
in real-life, clinical settings have illustrated how MERIT can be applied
to patients with widely varying and often quite complex clinical pre-
sentations. These include studies of patients who initially suffered from
mixtures of severe levels of negative symptoms, substance misuse,
disorganization, emotional distress and lack of insight whose meta-
cognition and function were observed to improve (Arnon-Ribenfeld
et al., 2018; de Jong et al., 2016b; Dubreucq et al., 2016; Hamm and
Firmin, 2016; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2017; James et al., 2018b;
Leonhardt et al., 2018; Leonhardt et al., 2016; Van Donkersgoed et al.,
2016). In an effort to synthesize the findings of these diverse case
studies, Hamm and Lysaker (2018) have suggested a three-stage process
which recurs across these reports: {i} a sense of agency was observed to
emerge, {ii} followed by the development of a more coherent sense of
self, {iii} followed by action and management of one's own recovery.
7. Summary and future directions
Bleuler suggested that the ongoing fragmentation of thought, emo-
tion and will are the fundamental phenomena which unify the diseases
he termed the schizophrenias. In this paper we suggested that to date
one impediment to the study of these claims has been the lack of a way
to operationalize and assess fragmentation in schizophrenia.
Accordingly, we have explored research employing the concepts of
metacognition to characterize the processes which enables information
to be integrated into a sense of self and others and metacognitive deficits
to describe the process by which sense of self could become fragmented
in the manner described by Bleuler. We have offered a description of
that rationale for one method of measuring metacognition which allows
for the assessment of the experience of self and others as varying from
greater degrees of fragmentation to greater degrees of integration. We
have summarized evidence from research using that method which
suggests that deficits in metacognition occur commonly in
schizophrenia and are related to basic neurobiological indices of brain
functioning. We have also further discussed evidence that metacogni-
tion is related to concurrent and prospective levels of psychological and
social functioning. Finally, we have examined how this work has pro-
moted the evolution and preliminary exploration of one therapy that
targets metacognitive capacity, Metacognitive Reflection and Insight
Therapy (MERIT).
Importantly, there are limitations to current observations and
findings and many questions remain. We have focused on one method
and more research is needed, for example, examining the relationship
of metacognition to related constructs including social cognition,
mentalization and source monitoring. It is also unclear to what extent
the observed metacognitive deficits are indeed multidetermined and
whether a unidirectional or bidirectional relationship exists between
metacognition and alterations in basic brain functions. For example,
when metacognitive gains are found in treatments like MERIT, are there
concurrent changes in brain functioning or related improvements in
neurocognition? Furthermore, this research has relied on the first
iteration of the MAS-A using narrative interviews in a laboratory set-
ting. It is likely that future developments will allow for more nuanced
assessments of metacognition in a broader range of contexts. The ma-
jority of the studies have also been cross sectional with modest sample
sizes. Long-term, longitudinal studies are therefore needed that include
a broad range of measures related to cognition as a whole, functioning
and metacognition with contrasting samples of persons with different
forms of mental health and psychological challenges.
Concerning psychological treatments and MERIT in particular,
larger randomized controlled trials with larger and broader samples are
needed in more diverse clinical settings. It is also unclear to what extent
this treatment can be applied to other patient groups. Case reports have
suggested MERIT may be useful for adults with Borderline Personality
Disorder (Buck et al., 2018; Vohs and Leonhardt, 2016), as well as with
considerable histories of trauma (Hillis et al., 2018), though it remains
unclear what types of modifications are needed for these and other
groups. MERIT also proposes its actions occur through eight different
processes, but it remains an empirical question whether the presence of
all or only specific elements is sufficient for change. MERIT treatment
dosages and personalization of treatment duration also remain open to
investigation.
Finally, empirical and theoretical work is needed to evolve more
explicit and nuanced models of how effortful and automatic processes,
as well as cognitive and embodied experiences come together to allow a
sense of self or others to be available in the moment. Self-experience is
necessarily a reflection of the ongoing and evolving interaction of
multiple facets (Lysaker and Lysaker, 2008). More research is needed to
explore the ways in which MERIT may promote this availability and
through which pathways persons gain a richer and stable sense of
themselves and others whose coherence can withstand contradiction,
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